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Note 
Conserving Culture: The Shift Towards 
International Criminal Liability for the 
Destruction of Cultural Property 
Andrew Miles 
INTRODUCTION 
The longstanding conflict in the Middle East has resulted in 
political turmoil, the loss of tens of thousands of lives, and the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands more.1 These atrocities 
can be linked to the Assad regime in Syria, along with ISIS 
attacks across the region.2 There has been a global response to 
try to curtail the violence and end the humanitarian crisis that 
has resulted in over one million Syrian refugees.3 While the 
world has been rightly focused on the tragedies of death and 
displacement, the destruction of cultural property by individuals 
associated with terrorist organizations has been an overlooked 
aspect to the humanitarian crisis. 
This Note shows that a calculated global response is needed 
to address the issue of mass destruction of cultural property and 
heritage sites across Europe and the Middle East. Part I of this 
Note describes the background of the destruction of cultural 
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 1. Greg Botelho, What’s Happening in the Middle East and Why it Matters, 
CNN (Jan. 24, 2015, 9:44 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/middleeast/
middle-east-country-breakdown/index.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Urges Countries to Take in 480,000 
Syrian Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
03/31/world/middleeast/united-nations-ban-ki-moon-syria-refugees.html. 
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property and the multiple sources of international law that have 
attempted to govern the destruction of cultural property. Part I 
then proceeds with a case study from the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. This section introduces 
Al Mahdi, the background of his case in the ICC, and its 
outcome. Part II, the analysis section, addresses the significance 
of Al Mahdi’s case in the context of the broader global effort to 
combat the destruction of cultural property. Lastly, Part II 
argues that a strong relationship between the five permanent 
members (P5) on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
and the ICC is necessary to deter the destruction of cultural 
property in the future. A stronger ICC would lead more states to 
take steps to protect their cultural property, and also deter 
wrongdoers from carrying out these crimes. Moreover, domestic 
militia in foreign territories would be more likely to protect 
cultural property during times of armed conflict due to 
customary legal norms that would emerge out of ICC 
jurisprudence. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW AIMED AT PROTECTING CULTURAL 
PROPERTY 
There are many sources of international law including 
numerous treaties aimed at protecting cultural property from 
being destroyed.4 The main difficulty in such protection, 
however, has been acquiring state signatories to sign on, thereby 
binding them to protect cultural property from being destroyed.5 
1. History of the Protection of Cultural Property 
The destruction of cultural property has been occurring for 
centuries. From the shelling of the Mostar Bridge in Bosnia 
Herzegovina and the Nazi destruction of synagogues and 
plundering of art during World War II, to al-Qaeda’s terrorist 
 
 4. See generally CAROLINE EHLERT, PROSECUTING THE DESTRUCTION OF 
CULTURAL PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 2–45 (2014) 
(describing the history of the prohibition of the destruction of cultural property 
within international treaties). 
 5. See, e.g., Matthew D. Thurlow, Note, Protecting Cultural Property in 
Iraq: How American Military Policy Comports with International Law, 8 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 165 (2005). 
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attacks on the World Trade Centers, the world has seen 
countless monuments be destroyed.6 
 The first attempts to protect cultural property came during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries during the 
Renaissance.7 Early international law scholars such as Hugo 
Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel believed that religious property 
like churches, memorials, temples, tombs, public buildings, and 
public monuments should be protected from destruction.8 
However, it was still acceptable to destroy buildings of this sort 
in order to pursue military operations that were deemed a 
“necessity.”9 De Vattel’s discourse brought about progress 
during the eighteenth century, whereby, despite the lack of a 
formal international treaty governing the destruction of cultural 
property, warring parties began to show due regard for religious 
and educational institutions in times of war.10 As this concept 
eventually emerged into customary international law,11 coming 
to an agreement on binding treaties proved difficult because of 
the inability to harmonize internationally-accepted definitions 
of “destruction,” “cultural property,” and “cultural heritage.”12 
Classic sources of international law have attempted to set 
the parameters for these terms. For example, “destruction” is 
known as “[d]emolishing manufactured products, installations 
and materials, or interrupting them or putting them out of order, 
for offensive or defensive purposes in the course of military 
operations.”13 “Cultural property” has been commonly defined as 
“[m]ovable or immovable property that has cultural significance, 
whether of the nature of antiquities and monuments of classical 
age or important modern items of fine arts, decorative arts, and 
architecture.”14 “Cultural heritage” has been explained as 
“movable property (artistic works) as well as immovable 
property (monuments, buildings, sites), works of expression 
(music, dance, theatre), intangible cultural property (folklore, 
talents, rituals, religious beliefs, intellectual traditions).”15 
 
 6. See EHLERT, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 7. Id. at 16. 
 8. Id. at 16–17. 
 9. Id. at 17. 
 10. Id. at 18. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 2–3. 
 13. PIETRO VERRI, DICTIONARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 40–41 (1992). 
 14. Cultural Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 15. JIŘÍ TOMAN, PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF 
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These terms have been implemented into modern international 
treaties to attempt to govern the destruction of cultural 
property. 
2. Sources of International Law Governing the Destruction 
of Cultural Property 
International law, much like domestic law, has evolved and 
attempted to implement individual responsibility for the 
destruction of cultural property. Early international 
humanitarian law was primarily governed by the theory of jus 
in bello, which governed the conduct of war once initiated.16 In 
1868, the St. Petersburg Declaration was adopted by dozens of 
nations in response to the Russian invention of a bullet that 
exploded on contact and caused mass damage.17 The declaration 
stated that “the only legitimate object which States should 
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military 
force of the enemy.”18 Hence, cultural property was off limits. 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions further codified violations of 
the destruction of cultural property. Articles 33 and 53 protect 
property from being pillaged, and only allow for the destruction 
of real property when it is an absolute necessity during military 
operations.19 Article 27 essentially protects cultural property by 
ensuring that protected persons have access to their “churches 
and other buildings dedicated to religion, which indirectly 
protects these institutions from being destroyed.”20 
A major development occurred in 1954, when two 
agreements were concluded. The Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with 
Regulations of the Execution of the Convention21 and the 
 
ARMED CONFLICT 40 (1996). 
 16. Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 
2010), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello. 
 17. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/130?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War art. 33, 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 20. EHLERT, supra note 4, at 41; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 19, art. 27. 
 21. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, May 14, 
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (entered into force Aug. 7, 1956). 
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Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
an Armed Conflict.22 The 1954 Hague Convention was the first 
international convention that exclusively dealt with the 
protection of cultural property.23 The main premise behind the 
Convention was the notion that there was a general, unified 
interest in protecting cultural property.24 Today, the 1954 Hague 
Convention has 131 States parties, and is seen by many authors 
and scholars as customary international law.25 
3. Can Individuals be Held Liable for the Destruction of 
Cultural Property under International Criminal Law? 
Strengthening an international system that punishes 
individuals for destroying cultural property is essential in order 
to thwart the ongoing epidemic. While still a flawed institution, 
the ICC has the greatest potential to bring these “cultural 
terrorists” to justice and protect cultural property from being 
destroyed. 
International criminal law (ICL) does not simply 
incorporate all of international humanitarian law (IHL) or 
human rights law because many states do not regard most of 
these violations as entailing individual responsibility.26 Early 
forms of ICL were codified in Article 6 of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, where the court 
had jurisdiction to prosecute defendants for crimes against 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.27 An offense 
falls under the auspices of ICL if it meets three conditions: first, 
the offense “must entail individual responsibility and be subject 
to punishment; second, the norm must be part of the body of 
international law; third, the offense must be punishable 
regardless of whether it has been incorporated into domestic 
law.”28 The third prong is particularly important because, as 
 
 22. Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358 (entered into force Aug. 7, 1956); see 
also EHLERT, supra note 4, at 43. 
 23. EHLERT, supra note 4, at 43. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/400 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018); EHLERT, supra note 4, at 44. 
 26. See EHLERT, supra note 4, at 4. 
 27. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
 28. EHLERT, supra note 4, at 7. 
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with some treaties discussed in the previous section, not all 
states have adopted them, and thus have not bound themselves 
to their language.29 Further, because some scholars regard 
neither the Geneva Conventions nor Hague Conventions as 
customary international law,30 the offense must be punishable 
regardless of whether it has been incorporated into domestic 
law. 
The primary international institution that enforces ICL is 
the ICC. The Rome Statute, which entered into force on July 1, 
2002,31 established the ICC and deemed it a permanent 
institution, responsible for prosecuting heinous crimes: 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.32 There are 
currently 123 countries that are States Parties to the Rome 
Statute, with 33 African states comprising the majority of any 
regional group.33 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines a number of war 
crimes that may be applied in cases related to the destruction of 
cultural property.34 Specifically, Article 8 labels extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property and “intentionally 
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, 
education, art, science or charitable purposes,” among others, as 
war crimes.35 
Even though the foundation for prosecuting individuals for 
the destruction of cultural property is codified in the Rome 
Statute, the actual investigations have seldom been completed.36 
There are three primary criticisms of the ICC’s lack of authority 
 
 29. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the 
Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 82 INT’L L. STUD. U.S. NAVAL WAR C. 37, 39 
(2006). 
 30. EHLERT, supra note 4, at 44; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-
95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 165–67 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Feb. 26, 2001). 
 31. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 
I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 32. Id. art. 5. 
 33. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/asp/Pages/asp_home.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) 
[hereinafter States Parties to the Rome Statute]. 
 34. Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 8. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Mark Kersten, The Al-Mahdi Case Is a Breakthrough for the 
International Criminal Court, JUST. CONFLICT (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/08/25/the-al-mahdi-case-is-a-breakthrough-
for-the-international-criminal-court/. 
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and inability to carry out investigations: the ICC has failed to 
garner universal support from powerful states, there is a 
complicated relationship between the ICC and the UNSC, and 
the ICC has been accused of systematically ignoring human 
rights abuses.37 
a. The ICC Does Not Have Universal Support 
Although 123 nations have signed the Rome Statute, 
powerful states such as the United States, Russia, and China 
have all been reluctant to sign on.38 Former United States 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld laid out numerous 
objections to the ICC, such as the lack of adequate checks and 
balances on powers of the Court’s prosecutors and judges, and 
the lack of any effective mechanism to prevent politicized 
prosecutions of American service members and officials.39 
Another common rationale for the United States’ reluctance to 
join the ICC comes from the “American Exceptionalist” 
viewpoint that Americans, not the international community, can 
better help suffering people.40 Because of these longstanding 
American views, devoting resources and sacrificing some 
sovereignty in order to support the ICC in carrying out 
prosecutions against individuals accused of destroying cultural 
property has been difficult. With much more pressing and 
widespread humanitarian crises ongoing, the United States-ICC 
relationship remains unlikely to be changed and at the mercy of 
the current president’s personal opinion of the Court.41 
 
 37. See David Hoile, ICC: The Failure that Keeps on Failing, NEW AFR. 
MAG. (Mar. 23, 2015), http://newafricanmagazine.com/icc-failure-keeps-failing/; 
see also Richard Dicker, Introduction, The ICC at 10, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 539 (2013). 
 38. See States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 33 (noting that 124 
countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute). 
 39. Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International 
Criminal Court Treaty, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (May 11, 2002), https://www.asil.org/
insights/volume/7/issue/7/us-announces-intent-not-ratify-international-
criminal-court-treaty. 
 40. See Melinda Negrón-Gonzales & Michael Contarino, Local Norms 
Matter: Understanding National Responses to the Responsibility to Protect, 20 
GLOB. GOVERNANCE 255, 267 (2014); Matthey Bulger, The International 
Criminal Court: Why Is the United States Not a Member?, THEHUMANIST.COM 
(June 19, 2013), https://thehumanist.com/news/international/the-international-
criminal-court-why-is-the-united-states-not-a-member. 
 41. Caitlin Lambert, The Evolving US Policy Towards the ICC, INT’L JUST. 
PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.internationaljusticeproject.com/the-
evolving-us-policy-towards-the-icc/. See also John Bellinger, The International 
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b. The Relationship Between the ICC and UNSC is 
“Complicated” 
The ICC is based on the principle of complementarity, 
whereby the court will not investigate and prosecute cases when 
states are willing and able to do so themselves.42 The principle 
of complementarity, however, is hampered by the UNSC. One 
way that cases fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction is by referral 
from the UNSC.43 However, because the Council is an 
undemocratic and political body, the referral power to the ICC 
has come at a “high cost for the legitimacy and functioning of” 
the Court.44 Moreover, because three of the five permanent 
members on the UNSC have not ratified the Rome Statute,45 any 
veto effectively immunizes themselves and their allies from any 
potential investigation or prosecution.46 Thus, complementarity 
and states’ willingness and ability to investigate and prosecute 
cases are not always the end all be all of employing the ICC. 
For example, many scholars have thoroughly examined how 
the language of the UNSC resolutions referring the situations in 
Sudan and Libya “limited the ICC’s jurisdiction to the relevant 
state under investigation . . . suggesting a hierarchy of crimes 
based on the individuals that perpetrated them.”47 Some actions, 
such as Russia’s acts in Chechnya and Israel’s occupation of 
Palestinian territories, have been off limits to the ICC because 
of the inevitable P5 vetoes.48 The ICC has also been unable to 
investigate the destruction of cultural and religious monuments 
 
Criminal Court and the Trump Administration, LAWFARE (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://lawfareblog.com/international-criminal-court-and-trump-
administration (arguing President Trump’s appointment of John Bolton as 
national security advisor will likely mean that the United States will not 
support the ICC under the Trump Administration). 
 42. See Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 17. 
 43. See Id. art. 13. 
 44. Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf, Regionalism, Regime Complexes, and the Crisis 
in International Criminal Justice, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 699, 711 (2016). 
 45. See States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 33 (showing that 
United States, Russia, and China have not signed the Rome Statute); 
Permanent and Non-Permanent Members, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
 46. Sirleaf, supra note 44. 
 47. Rosa Aloisi, A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security 
Council and the International Criminal Court, in THE REALITIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 153 (Dawn L. Rothe et al. eds., 2013). 
 48. See, e.g., Mark Tran, Background: International Criminal Court, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2009, 7:13 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2009/jan/26/international-criminal-court. 
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in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.49 Because these 
countries are not members of the court, only a specific mandate 
from the UNSC gives the ICC jurisdiction to investigate and 
prosecute these war crimes.50 The politics in the UNSC 
effectively immobilizes the ICC from investigating and 
prosecuting war criminals that are killing others; this is a bad 
sign for any agreement to prosecute individuals accused of 
destroying cultural property. 
c. The ICC Has Systematically Ignored Human Rights 
Abuses 
Some scholars have charged the ICC with ignoring blatant 
human rights violations perpetrated by powerful nations, such 
as the P5, in selecting its investigations.51 Additionally, 
observers have noted that it is not coincidental that the only 
places where the ICC is investigating and prosecuting 
individuals are where the United States and other powerful 
states have few interests or resources.52 In its brief history, the 
ICC has only prosecuted Africans, a continent with a weak global 
position and with few natural resources that make it an 
unimportant ally of the United States.53 There was hope that the 
United States would tone down its opposition to the ICC during 
the Obama administration, but the United States’ ratification of 
the Rome Treaty was still seen as highly unlikely.54 
 
 
 49. See Marlise Simmons, Prison Sentence over Smashing of Shrines in 
Timbuktu: 9 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
09/28/world/europe/ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi-timbuktu-mali.html?_r=2. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Ifeonu Eberechi, “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects”: 
Exclusion, Selectivity, and Impunity in the Enforcement of International 
Criminal Justice and the African Union’s Emerging Resistance, 4 AFR. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 51, 56 (2011). 
 52. Mahmood Mamdani, Darfur, ICC and the New Humanitarian Order: 
How the ICC’s “Responsibility to Protect” is Being Turned into an Assertion of 
Neocolonial Domination, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Sept. 17, 2008), 
https://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/50568. 
 53. Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH, (Jan. 14, 2014, 3:22PM EST), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/
01/14/africa-attacks-international-criminal-court. 
 54. See Tran, supra note 48. 
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B. PROSECUTOR V. AHMAD AL FAQI AL MAHDI 
Although the ICC has been flawed in its ability to 
investigate and prosecute individuals for their crimes, including 
the destruction of cultural property, there has been a recent 
revelation in the prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi that 
gives the institution some credibility and hope. This section will 
lay out the facts of Al Madhi’s case, including how it was brought 
to the ICC, and its outcome. 
1. The Facts 
A coalition of Tuareg rebels and Islamic militant factions 
including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and a local group 
called Ansar Dine seized much of the northern part of Mali in 
mid-2012.55 These rebels enforced a harsh version of Sharia law 
in areas under their control, banning music, forcing women to 
wear the burqa and preventing girls from attending school.56 Al 
Mahdi traveled to Timbuktu shortly after it fell to the 
extremists.57 He was later named their religious adviser and was 
given command of the Hisba, a religious police charged with 
stamping out “evil practices” and encouraging “correct” 
behavior.58 
In mid-2012, Al Mahdi led a group of radicals that destroyed 
fourteen of Timbuktu’s sixteen mausoleums.59 These 
mausoleums contained one-room structures that housed the 
tombs of the city’s greatest thinkers, and were also listed on the 
World Heritage List.60 Al Mahdi and his radical-led group 
considered these tombs “totems of idolatry,” and counter to the 
ideals of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other Islamic factions.61 The 
 
 55. Jason Burke, ICC Ruling for Timbuktu Destruction “Should Be 
Deterrent for Others,” GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2016, 6:25 AM EDT), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/27/timbuktu-shrines-icc-
sentences-islamic-militant-nine-years-destruction-ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi Pleads Guilty at ICC to Destroying Timbuktu 
Tombs, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2016, 6:34 AM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/world/ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi-pleads-guilty-icc-destroying-timbuktu-
n635716. 
 60. Id.; Timbuktu, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CTR., http://whc.unesco.
org/en/list/119 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
 61. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi Pleads Guilty at ICC to Destroying Timbuktu 
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shrines were “the heart of Mali’s cultural heritage and were of 
great importance to the people of Timbuktu;” their destruction 
affected not only the direct victims of crimes, but also the people 
throughout Mali and the international community.62 
2. The Charge 
The Government of Mali officially referred the situation to 
the ICC on July 13, 2012.63 Al Mahdi was formally accused 
pursuant to Article 25(3)(a)–(d) of the Rome Statute of 
intentionally directing attacks against the ten religious 
monuments and buildings.64 All but one of the structures was 
part of the Timbuktu World Heritage site recognized by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO).65 The Office of the Prosecutor for the 
ICC opened an investigation on January 6, 2013.66 On 
September 8, 2015, the Court issued a formal warrant for his 
arrest for war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against 
historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion, 
including nine mausoleums in Timbuktu, Mali, between June 30 
and July 10, 2012.67 The Niger government surrendered Al 
Mahdi, where he was taking shelter, to the ICC on September 
26, 2015.68 
Al Mahdi’s trial lasted for three days from August 22 to 
August 24, 2016.69 In a surprise to the international community, 
Al Mahdi pleaded guilty of the war crime consisting of destroying 
cultural and religious monuments.70 Finally, on September 27, 
2016, the ICC found Al Mahdi guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
 
Tombs, supra note 59. 
 62. Burke, supra note 55. 
 63. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Case Information 
Sheet (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi/Documents/Al-
MahdiEng.pdf. 
 64. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, 
¶¶ 57, 61 (Sept. 27, 2016). 
 65. Simmons, supra note 49. 
 66. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Case Information 
Sheet (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi/Documents/Al-
MahdiEng.pdf. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Mark Kersten, Some Thoughts on the Al Mahdi Trial and Guilty Plea, 
JUST. CONFLICT (Aug. 24, 2016), https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/08/24/some-
thoughts-on-the-al-mahdi-trial-and-guilty-plea/. 
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of the war crimes, and he was sentenced to nine years 
imprisonment.71 
3. Al Mahdi’s Prosecution 
The prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi represents a 
number of firsts for global justice.72 The member of the terrorist 
organization Ansar Dine will now be in prison for nine years, but 
it is less clear how this case will resonate around the world, and 
whether it can deter similar crimes.73 However, although subject 
to some skepticism, Al Mahdi’s sentence still represents a 
significant victory for international justice and shows that there 
is hope that the ICC can expand its prosecutions and continue 
its efforts to protect cultural property. 
a. Criticisms of the ICC’s Verdict Against Al Mahdi 
Not all international legal scholars and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) praised the ICC’s prosecution of Al Mahdi. 
For example, Amnesty International’s Senior Legal Advisor 
Erica Bussey commented that while the ICC’s prosecution was 
groundbreaking, other war crimes in Mali, such as murder, rape, 
and torture of civilians, remain unaddressed.74 The 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), an NGO 
dedicated to the worldwide movement for human rights, 
expressed their desire that other Malians should have been 
charged with sexual and gender-based crimes, in addition to the 
charges Al Mahdi received for destroying the cultural sites in 
Timbuktu.75 Human Rights Watch called for the Malian 
government to step up their efforts to ensure investigations and 
fair trials for all human rights abusers during the 2012 conflict 
 
 71. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, 
¶¶ 43, 109 (Sept. 27, 2016). 
 72. See Kersten, supra note 36. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Mali: ICC Trial over Destruction of Cultural Property in Timbuktu 
Shows Need for Broader Accountability, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 22, 2016), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/mali-icc-trial-over-
destruction-of-cultural-property-in-timbuktu-shows-need-for-broader-
accountability/. 
 75. See Mali: Al Mahdi Trial on Destruction of Cultural Heritage Opens at 
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al-mahdi-trial-on-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-opens-at-the. 
2018] CONSERVING CULTURE 593 
in Mali.76 Some scholars expressed that the ICC actually had the 
“wrong man” on trial77 and that Al Mahdi was just a “little fish” 
in the grand scheme of the horrific violence in Mali.78 
Other scholars have also been wary of the prosecution 
because it is another “attack” on African nations by the 
international court.79 Both Burundi and South Africa have 
announced that they intend to withdraw from the Rome Statute, 
which campaigners for international justice say could lead to a 
“devastating exodus” from the ICC.80 Scholars argue that the 
African Union (AU) has been a forum for anti-ICC sentiment, 
and other African nations may now seek to withdraw from the 
Court.81 This “African bias” in the court can be seen in the 
numbers; the Office of the Prosecutor has sought to bring 
charges against thirty-one individuals since the court began 
operating in 2002, and all of them have been African.82 Although 
ICC prosecutors have claimed to be considering alleged crimes 
in South America, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, no 
concrete actions have occurred.83 Furthermore, by some 
estimates, the ICC’s activities have cost at least $1.5 billion,84 a 
significant expense considering the very narrow geographical 
scope of its investigations and lack of success in bringing justice. 
Despite these criticisms, however, the prosecution of Al 
Mahdi was very significant for the ICC and boosted their 
legitimacy as an international tribunal capable of bring justice. 
 
 76. See ICC: Clear Message on Attacking World’s Treasures, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Sept. 27, 2016, 8:39 AM EDT), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/
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 77. See Fatouma Harber, Why the ICC Has the Wrong Man on Trial over 
Invasion of Timbuktu, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2015, 3:00 AM EDT), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/30/icc-mali-timbuktu-invasion-
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Withdraw from International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/world/africa/south-africa-international-
criminal-court.html (discussing the ICC’s allegedly disproportionate focus on 
Africa). 
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Because of Al Mahdi’s sentence, countries—especially African 
countries—should look to give more political support to the ICC. 
Many African nations, including Mali, do not have the political 
or judicial infrastructure to prosecute serious war crimes.85 This 
was one of the primary reasons why Mali actually referred Al 
Mahdi’s case to the ICC.86 In the wake of the announced 
withdrawals by South Africa, Burundi, and Gambia, a slew of 
African governments have reaffirmed their backing for the 
ICC.87 The ICC’s docket has also begun to evolve, which makes 
the court more of an instrument of international justice, instead 
of African targeting.88 If the ICC’s imperfections are to be cured, 
then countries should be working together to garner more 
support for the ICC, not the opposite.89 With more support from 
African nations, the ICC would be better suited to bring justice 
across the globe to those not only affected by the destruction of 
cultural property, but also against victims of other heinous war 
crimes. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AL MAHDI’S PROSECUTION 
Al Mahdi’s case was groundbreaking for several reasons.90 
This was the first case arising from the 2012 conflict in Mali.91 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, this was the first time 
that the destruction of religious and historical sites has been 
made a priority charge as a war crime.92 Additionally, it was the 
first time ever that an ICC war crimes defendant had pleaded 
guilty.93 Finally, this was the ICC’s first prosecution of an 
accused jihadist.94 
Although international law has safeguarded cultural 
property for centuries, international bodies and actors have 
praised the ICC’s ruling for making much needed progress to 
protect it.95 For example, Irina Bokova, the Director-General of 
UNESCO, applauded the ICC’s efforts in the prosecution and 
dubbed the organization as a “key element” in the broader, 
global response to violent extremism.96 
 
 
 
 90. See generally Guilty Plea at ICC Timbuktu Artefacts Destruction Case: 
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1. Al Mahdi’s Prosecution Will Help Deter Other War 
Criminals in the Future 
In present-day Iraq and Syria, other members of terrorist 
organizations, such as ISIS, have sought to annihilate or loot 
irreplaceable cultural heritage on a massive scale.97 While there 
are many reasons for this destruction, two common ones are 
important to address. First, the looting of cultural heritage is a 
method to fund continued engagement in a conflict or terrorist 
activity. Second, the destruction of cultural heritage can further 
the comprehensive denigration and destruction of the opposing 
party in conflict—for now and future generations.98 Prosecuting 
Al Mahdi for destroying these sacred monuments sent a stark 
message to both the people of Timbuktu and to those looking to 
continue carrying out the heinous war crimes: cultural property 
is important, is valued by the international community, and will 
be protected.99 Seeking accountability for war crimes of this 
nature also sends a strong signal to Ansar Dine, the Islamic 
State, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations that such 
conduct will not be tolerated.100 The ICC can use the Al Mahdi 
verdict as a precedent in prosecuting destruction of cultural 
property, which has the potential to deter would-be war 
criminals from carrying it out.101 
While some commentators have found it unlikely that an 
ISIS terrorist would pause the next time they are about to 
destroy a holy temple or mosque,102 the Al Mahdi verdict still 
has a deterrent effect towards future perpetrators. This is partly 
because the ICC has custody over a known terrorist who is likely 
to give investigators evidence of violent crimes committed 
against human victims.103 This is especially important given 
that the ICC has yet to indict anyone for murder or sexual 
violence in Mali, and shows the importance of the verdict.104 
 
 97. Paul Williams & C. Danae Paterson, Tear It All Down: The Significance 
of the Al-Mahdi Case and the War Crime of Destruction of Cultural Heritage, 
WORLDPOST (Sept. 26, 2016, 11:23 AM EST), http://www.huffington
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Scholars have also noted the impact of the “Lubanga Syndrome,” 
in which anecdotal evidence shows how the impact of the 
Lubanga case has generated a fear of arrest among Congolese 
militia leaders.105 Reportedly, the Lubanga Syndrome has 
induced Congolese militia leaders to release child soldiers from 
their ranks and into Disarmament Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) programs.106 Other early studies on 
prosecutorial deterrence show very promising results in terms of 
halting hostilities in civil wars and violence against civilians, as 
well as increasing domestic prosecutions of lower-level officials 
in accordance with ICC prosecutions.107 Similar phenomena 
could hopefully lead to analogous deterrence effects related to 
the crime of destruction of cultural property. 
2. Selectivity in Al Mahdi’s Prosecution is Inevitable and 
Still Possesses a Deterrent Effect 
The argument that Al Mahdi was too small of a player in the 
Timbuktu travesty to make the ICC prosecution meaningful 
does not hold merit. Since the complementarity principle 
ensures that the ICC functions in a selective manner, the court 
has to manage expectations and selectively pick and choose 
which cases to investigate and prosecute.108 Fatou Bensouda, the 
Prosecutor of the Court, has exercised her prosecutorial 
discretion in themes, whereby nationally under-prosecuted 
crimes are prioritized to help shatter domestic cultures of 
impunity.109 Ms. Bensouda had, until the Al Mahdi case, chosen 
the prosecutorial themes of gender-based crimes and crimes 
against children.110 Although not as severe as violence targeted 
 
 105. See generally Mark Kersten, The International Criminal Court and 
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towards children or based on a person’s gender, Ms. Bensouda, 
by selecting Al Mahdi’s case to be prosecuted, has added a vision 
to the attacks on the cultural properties and has projected the 
idea of “cultural genocide.”111 
Other factors aside from prosecutorial discretion also played 
a role in opening a case against Al Mahdi. Operational and 
practical factors, such as being able to collect relevant and 
necessary evidence, are key when the ICC determines where to 
invest their scarce resources.112 The Al Mahdi case took these 
factors into consideration when they chose to prosecute Al Mahdi 
under the war crimes provision of the Rome Statute.113 
Therefore, the absence of Ms. Bensouda tacking on sexual crimes 
in Al Mahdi’s case should not lament this case as a failure or 
exclusion; rather, observers should focus on the success that the 
ICC had in getting a guilty verdict, which strengthened a new 
criminal theme that can lead to future deterrence.114 Moreover, 
the fact that the ICC prosecuted this case without expending 
many resources gives hope that cultural property cases can be  
more efficient and “easier” cases to prosecute.115 
3. Al Mahdi’s Prosecution Can Help Protect Africa from 
International Crimes; It Does Not Target Them 
While the ICC has tended to focus its resources towards 
African nations, the prosecution of Al Mahdi in particular can 
actually have a positive effect on the continent. Mali referred Al 
Mahdi’s case to the ICC to get assistance in the investigation.116 
Because the ICC does not have a police or military force and 
operates without an enforcement body, it is highly dependent on 
state cooperation to execute arrest warrants, provide access to 
evidence, enable the relocation of witnesses, and ensure the 
enforcement of sentences.117 The case showed that two African 
nations—Mali and Niger—cooperated together to work with the 
ICC, and combated the perception that the continent is somehow 
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 116. Press Release, Int’l Fed’n for Human Rights, Q&A: The Al Mahdi Case 
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“against” the court.118 Because prosecutions for the gender-based 
and sexual crimes in Mali have been out of the ICC’s grasp, the 
court showed that it could help bring justice to war-torn African 
nations that are incapable of carrying out investigations.119 
A unique provision in the Rome Statute also allows victims 
to participate in Al Mahdi’s trial. Article 68.3 guarantees victims 
a right to participate in trial proceedings.120 Nine applications 
were filed for participation in Al Mahdi’s trial.121 The Trial 
Chamber found that each of the victims suffered “personal and 
economic moral harm” as a result of Al Mahdi’s actions.122 The 
African victims who participated in this trial demonstrate how 
the destruction of cultural property damages more than 
buildings and monuments; it also harms the social, cultural, and 
historic fabric of communities.123 This participation in 
proceedings shows the transparency of the ICC and its 
willingness to bring justice to those harmed by war crimes, 
which is something that African nations themselves cannot 
always do. 
B. A SOLUTION TO THE ICC’S LEGITIMACY PROBLEM: U.N. 
SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR PROSECUTING THE 
DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
The objectives of the United Nations (“U.N.”) are laid out in 
the U.N. Charter’s Preamble, whereby human rights and the 
respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law are paramount.124 Today, the U.N. faces a 
plethora of issues125 that have to be dealt with in a systematic 
manner. However, with 193 member nations126 and the potential 
of a veto on any proposed course of action from members of the 
P5, the U.N. has struggled with maintaining international peace 
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in recent years.127 Decisive action from the UNSC is needed to 
start saving cultural property from being destroyed and 
thwarting the rogue terrorists who are undertaking these 
heinous acts. A concentrated global response to the destruction 
of cultural property led by the P5 would help prevent this issue 
and also bring more legitimacy and opportunity to the ICC to 
expand their prosecutions towards other war crimes in the 
future. 
1. Increased Cooperation Between the P5 and ICC is 
Paramount to Streamlining Investigations and 
Ultimately Preventing War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity 
The Rome Statute reserved a role for the UNSC in regards 
to the ICC, “whereby the Council can refer situations in which 
one or more crimes appears to have been committed in any State, 
regardless of whether it has ratified the Statute of the Court, 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”128 The ICC, however, is 
an independent “branch” that does not rely on UNSC referrals, 
and can operate without UNSC consent.129 When the UNSC has 
chosen to intervene and refer cases to the ICC, the results were 
mixed. Twice in its history the UNSC has made use of its powers 
to refer situations in non-Party States to the ICC: in Sudan 
(Darfur) in 2005, and in Libya in 2011.130 Scholars have 
applauded these referrals by the UNSC as part of a broader 
effort to “maintain international peace and security.”131 Others, 
however, have been critical of the P5’s role in bringing visible 
success to these conflicts.132 In order to bring individual 
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accountability to those responsible for destroying cultural 
property, the P5 and the ICC need to take practical steps that 
can encourage better coordination for current and future 
investigations. 
First, the ICC Assembly of States Parties needs to create a 
formal mechanism whereby both UNSC members that are also 
members of the ICC and the P5 meet regularly to discuss 
relevant issues.133 With an improved relationship centered on 
communication in regards to the destruction of cultural 
property, local conditions where it is taking place, and the 
domestic judicial environment, it is more likely that the UNSC 
as a whole will be better suited to understand these pressing 
issues. The United Kingdom and France should lead the way 
within this new commission, since they are both P5 members 
and parties to the Rome Statute.134 Their leadership would 
ensure the mechanism’s stability and continuity.135 France has 
already taken leadership in terms of attempting to curtail the 
use of the P5 veto power in cases where a mass atrocity has been 
ascertained.136 
This kind of agenda, while ambitious, is necessary to mend 
the contentious relationship between the P5 and the ICC, and to 
eventually make it unimaginable for a P5 member to veto 
resolutions that refer genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
larger-scale war crimes to the ICC.137 A “Responsibility Not to 
Veto” is perhaps the most suitable way to improve UNSC-ICC 
relationship, given that customs and norms are pillars of the 
international legal order.138 It is worth noting that the UNSC 
has been critical of ISIS’s destruction of religious and cultural 
artifacts in Mosul, Iraq.139 This kind of “peer pressure” from the 
world’s most powerful countries is an important first step to 
recognizing and dealing with this humanitarian crisis. While it 
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is extremely unlikely that a simple press release will deter ISIS 
fighters from destroying cultural and religious artifacts, it is 
nonetheless a vital first step to combating the problem. UNSC 
leadership in this arena is critical to preventing these mass 
atrocities in the future. 
Second, an improved relationship between the P5 and ICC 
will have a deterrent effect towards those committing crimes 
against humanity and war crimes; other war crimes in addition 
to the destruction of cultural property will decrease as a result 
of this working relationship. Although less important than 
shocking acts of murder, torture, beating, or rape,140 prosecuting 
the destruction of cultural property is attractive for a few 
reasons. For one, it will aid the ICC in improving their 
investigative and prosecutorial techniques. As the ICC improves 
its methods to gather evidence and witnesses, and works in 
harmony with member-states to bring more prosecutions, it may 
be able to shift its resources towards prosecuting the serious war 
criminals that are suspected of murder, rape, and torture. This 
is a goal that both the P5 and ICC should share. 
Third, investigating the destruction of cultural property 
does not have to be done in times of war. Gathering evidence and 
putting together a successful case in a war-torn region under the 
rule of a despot may prove extremely difficult for ICC 
prosecutors, and is perhaps one of the primary reasons why they 
choose to stay away from more serious war crimes.141 A 
prosecutor’s ability to interview witnesses and collect evidence 
in response to cultural terrorists destroying cultural property is 
likely to be difficult to achieve when people in a village are being 
raped or pillaged. Thus, the conditions are oftentimes ideal for 
an international body to conduct a successful investigation. 
Lastly, if the P5 and the ICC choose to team up and combat the 
destruction of cultural property, they can preserve items and 
artifacts which hold economic, political, and social value for their 
nations and their peoples.142 As a normative manner, cultural 
 
 140. Sarah J. Thomas, Prosecuting the Crime of Destruction of Cultural 
Property, GENOCIDE WATCH, http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Cambodia_
Prosecuting_the_Crime_of_Destruction_of_Cultural_Property.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2018). 
 141. See H.E. Judge, Second Vice-President of the International Criminal 
Court, Keynote Address at Salzburg Law School on International Criminal Law: 
The International Criminal Court – Current Challenges and Perspectives (Aug. 
8, 2011). 
 142. See David W. Bowker et al., Confronting ISIS’s War on Cultural 
Property, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (July 14, 2016), https://www.asil.org/insights/
2018] CONSERVING CULTURE 603 
property is important because it encompasses a nation’s identity 
and past; it is not readily replaceable; once looted, defaced, or 
destroyed, it may be lost forever.143 Instead of being a symbol of 
national heritage and pride, cultural property is being plundered 
and sold off to finance terrorist operations.144 Because terrorist-
laded countries such as Iraq and Syria are not members to the 
Rome Statute, the ICC does not have personal or territorial 
jurisdiction over them.145 Thus, the UNSC needs to be willing 
and able to recommend prosecutions to the ICC in order to 
preserve cultural heritage when it is under siege. Scholars have 
proposed a number of other measures in the hopes of preventing, 
deterring, and punishing ISIS for its devastation of cultural 
property.146 However, prosecutorial efforts are the most effective 
way to deter the destruction of cultural property now and into 
the future. 
2. A P5-ICC Coalition Can Help Guide Domestic Militaries 
and Create International Legal Norms to Protect Cultural 
Property during Times of Armed Conflict 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a 
treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States 
in written form and governed by international law . . . .”147 
However, treaty law often leaves large gaps that need to be 
filled.148 Those gaps are filled by customary international law, 
whereby the international community has developed a set of 
definable rules through custom that nations must accept as 
law.149 Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) asserts that custom is “evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law” that forms a fundamental part of 
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international law.150 While the United States has signed the 
Vienna Convention Treaty, the United States Senate has not 
given its advice and consent, and therefore has not ratified it.151 
However, the United States considers many of the provisions of 
the Vienna Convention to constitute customary international 
law on the law of treaties.152 Because the United States is 
arguably the most powerful member of the P5 that has not 
ratified the Rome Statute, customary international law 
protecting cultural property should govern their armed forces in 
times of armed conflict.153 A strong P5-ICC alliance could 
therefore create effective mechanisms and customary 
international legal norms to protect cultural property in times of 
armed conflict. 
Furthermore, it is imperative for armed forces to protect 
cultural property in times of armed conflict. Avoidable 
destruction of cultural property by military forces, especially 
foreign military forces, endangers mission success.154 The 
destruction of cultural property arouses the hostility of local 
populations, offers the adversary a potent propaganda weapon, 
undermines support on the home front among allies for the 
continued pursuit of victory, and provides a source of income for 
hostile non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations;155 
similar to the one Al Mahdi led. 
On the other hand, if a strong alliance is formed between 
the P5 and the ICC that lays out rules protecting cultural 
property in times of war, foreign militia can win the hearts and 
minds of those affected by the destruction. While this Note has 
addressed numerous sources of international law that have 
attempted to govern the destruction of cultural property, there 
is still a gap in the literature. The literature has failed to address 
how a strong relationship between the P5 and the ICC can create 
international legal norms for armed forces to follow in their 
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efforts to prevent destruction—especially in the aftermath of Al 
Mahdi’s trial. Both the P5 and ICC should look to build on the 
momentum of Al Mahdi’s guilty verdict to streamline 
communication between member state’s militias and the ICC in 
regards to the conditions surrounding cultural property in times 
of armed conflict. 
The reason for the P5 and ICC to govern the protection of 
cultural property in times of war is twofold. First, a unifying role 
in articulating resources, procedures, and norms would be 
advantageous to operations as sovereign militaries assess, plan, 
and implement the international customary rules to protect 
cultural property. This would increase cooperation among 
states, and militaries could share technology and information 
with each other in their joint efforts to protect cultural property. 
For example, best practice dictates that particularly significant 
cultural property should be placed on a no-strike list to be 
utilized by military planners during target selection.156 This has 
proved successful in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Mali, all of whom are 
rich in cultural heritage sites.157 Because the “boots on the 
ground” will be more informed on the country conditions where 
they are stationed, they can also employ the help of civilian 
experts in their efforts to protect the cultural heritage sites. As 
mentioned earlier, this will help win the “hearts and minds” of 
the civilian populations.158 The United States and other 
international organizations already have developed a range of 
training materials for military and associated personnel on the 
protection of cultural property in both armed conflict and 
stabilization missions.159 
Consolidating these methods and sharing resources with the 
rest of the P5 and ICC would only strengthen domestic 
militaries’ efforts in protecting cultural property. Second, 
because the P5 countries are often the ones who occupy other 
nations in times of armed conflict, international law imposes 
temporary duties on them to act as a “custodian” until the 
sovereign’s governing authority is restored.160 Thus, if the goal 
is for the occupying hosts to protect the country they are 
occupying, it is best if they write the rules to protect cultural 
property. These countries are the ones who are familiar with the 
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conditions on the ground in some of these war-torn countries, so 
working together with other P5 nations, while aiding the ICC in 
their prosecutorial efforts, is the most effective and efficient way 
to protect cultural property now and into the future. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi represents a 
significant shift in the international community’s attitude 
towards protecting cultural property. Never before has the 
destruction of cultural property been prosecuted as a standalone 
war crime. The fact that Al Mahdi was a member of a known 
terrorist organization makes the prosecution all the sweeter for 
those committed to protecting their cultural heritage from being 
plundered by these rebels. 
Although ISIS and other non-state actors are not parties to 
the many declarations and treaties that protect cultural 
property, they are still bound by IHL and customary 
international law.161 The ICC Prosecutor, despite the many 
hurdles, needs to attempt to build a relationship with the UNSC 
and other nation states—especially African states—to form a 
strong coalition to combat the destruction of cultural property. 
However, this relationship needs to be coequal, and nation states 
need to be more receptive of the Prosecutor’s role, and the 
challenges that she faces when states continuously try to 
undermine the ICC’s legitimacy. The hope is that Al Mahdi’s 
prosecution spurs even more action from both domestic 
governments and the ICC, and that region-by-region, country-
by-country, cultural property can be protected for generations to 
come. 
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